Abstract-Cooling failure in data centers (DCs) is a complex phenomenon due to the many interactions between the cooling infrastructure and the information technology equipment (IT). To fully understand it, a system integration philosophy is vital to the testing and design of experiment. In this paper, a facility-level DC cooling failure experiment is run and analyzed. An airside cooling failure is introduced to the facility during two different cooling set points as well as in open and contained environments. Quantitative instrumentation includes pressure differentials, tile airflow, external contour and discrete air inlet temperature, intelligent platform management interface (IPMI), and cooling system data during failure recovery. Qualitative measurements include infrared imaging and airflow visualization via smoke trace. To our knowledge of current literature, this is the first experimental study in which an actual multi-aisle facility cooling failure is run with real IT (compute, network, and storage) load in the white space. This will establish a link between variations from the facility to the central processing unit (CPU). The results show that using the external IT inlet temperature sensors, the containment configuration shows a longer available uptime (AU) during failure. However, the IPMI data show the opposite. In fact, the available uptime is reduced significantly when the external sensors are compared to internal IT analytics. The response of the IT power, CPU temperature, and fan speed shows higher values during the containment failure. This occurs because of the instantaneous formation of external impedances in the containment during failure, which renders the contained 
SRH Supply relative humidity. TTR Time to recover. T A2 American Society of Heating, Refrigerating, and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) A2 upper dry bulb temperature limit (35°C). T bf Before failure temperature (°C,°F).
T r
Reference temperature (°C,°F).
T s
Supply temperature for COP estimation (°C). UPS Uninterruptable power supply.
I. INTRODUCTION

M
OST DCs are designed with the IT connected to the UPS backup power. The supporting infrastructure such as the cooling system is usually connected to a generator backup power as well. In the event of a power failure, the IT that is connected to the UPS batteries runs continuously and keeps expelling heat into the space. The backup generators typically come online within 10-20 s [1] , which allows cooling equipment to come back online promptly after failure, thus maintaining resilience for the IT equipment.
However, cooling unit failures, accidental human errors, and weather-related events are the causes of 51% of unplanned outage events in DCs [2] . In the event of cooling equipment failure specifically (water, pump, and/or blowers' failure), cooling failure could endure for minutes. During this timeframe, IT inlet temperatures increase rapidly until reaching a certain threshold, after which the IT overheats and then shut downs. The time between the failure event and IT termination is defined as the RTT or AU. The AU period will depend on parameters such as the supply set point, deployment of containment, and power density.
With regard to finance, the effects of DC outages are becoming increasingly costly. A recent cost analysis survey of DCs outages by Ponemon Institution [3] has reported that the maximum downtime costs have increased by 32% since 2013 and 81% since 2010. Based on the same survey, the maximum downtime cost for 2016 alone so far has been $2 409 991. While those numbers reflect the sample surveyed, they are a clear indication that there are financial consequences to cooling failures in DCs by and large. In fact, as an increasing number of online services begin to depend on cloud infrastructure, even a single DC power outage can have a broad impact.
To pursue energy savings and mitigate the financial burden of cooling failure, facility operation must be examined under the extremes of the ASHRAE recommended range for dry bulb temperature and humidity. To that end, it is imperative to note the impact of these extremes on the reliability of operations [4] . Each piece of hardware is defined by its manufacturer to operate within a certain envelope/class of temperature and humidity. Note that IT manufacturers typically test only their equipment with zero external static pressure. With regard to temperature, it has been proved that the x-factor increases as the IT inlet temperature increases. In general, operating at the higher limits of the recommended guidelines (e.g., ASHRAE A1, A2, …) will lead to a lower facility resiliency upon cooling failure. Similarly, operating at higher values of humidity accelerates corrosion failure, while operating at lower values can lead to electrostatic discharge hot spots.
Characterizing DC performance during normal operation or failure can be done with either experimental measurements or analytical models. An example of experimental characterization of a DC facility was discussed in [5] and [6] where a mobile measurement tool was used to ascertain thermal conditions for the facility. Metrics such as horizontal and vertical hotspots, targeted airflow, and CRAH set points were used to capture inefficiencies in the facility operation. Due to the large sum of data obtained, a statistical analysis was necessary in order to better understand facility level performance. On the other hand, analytical models such as those discussed in [7] - [10] were also used to extract the DC performance metrics against different parameters, such as the supply temperature, the temperature raise across the IT, the deploying containment, and an IT fan control strategy. The current study will focus on empirical analysis and data collection to understand the behavior of the DC during a cooling failure.
Whether under the conditions of normal operation or an outage scenario, the IT cooling performance is usually revealed by the measured inlet air temperature. There are two methods for measuring IT temperature data. One is the best practices method, which is based on three (discrete/external) temperature sensors per cabinet, 1 in away from IT or at the rack door. The second is utilizing the IPMI-based inlet temperature (internal) data, which is usually built in the IT. For example, thermistors located inside the server near the airflow intake inlet. Platform level instrumented x86 servers were discussed in [10] . Embedded IPMI sensors were used to report the thermal and compute behaviors of IT equipment and optimize them during facility operation. This type of platform telemetry can lead to significant energy savings since the data reported is directly related to IT performance [12] .
Airflow is equally important for quantifying adequate cooling to IT, but is more challenging to measure per server. A method for predicting the airflow delivery of IT using fan speed logging and facility pressure differentials was discussed in [13] . The general airflow prediction equation was introduced with correction factors to compensate for different IT fan speeds. Deploying a containment solution in DCs greatly affects the DC performance in normal operation as well as in failure modes. By definition, the containment solution is meant to segregate hot and cold airflow regions. Recent studies have demonstrated the importance of properly sealing around the containment's physical structure. In a test facility [14] , it was shown that properly sealing gaps and leakage paths in the CAC structure could yield up to $167 821 in operational expenditure (OPEX) (∼200 kW at $0.1 kWh). Uniform temperature fields were obtained in a properly sealed environment, which allowed for a further increase in the cooling unit supply set point or a decrease in the airflow delivery.
Each cooling solution is accompanied by its own set of reliability challenges. For example, in the airside economizer solution, particulates and contaminates can affect the longevity of the IT lifespan. Similarly, the containment solution has its own set of reliability questions, one of which is the AU or RTT at cooling failure. In an attempt to answer this question, a cooling failure was initiated in a test DC laboratory in [1] . Different arrangements of the load banks were used to generate different IT loads. Emphasis was placed on the case in which the IT load was 45.9 kW with an airflow demand of 5225 CFM (2.46 m 3 /s). The D/X cooling unit was failed for both opened and contained scenarios. It was observed that the RTT (in this case time until CAC temperature reached 35°C) was 4 min in the open environment but was 19 min when contained. This is explained by the coupling that containment creates between the IT and the remaining cooling energy stored in the cooling coils in the passive cooling unit. Note that the duration of the RTT in the contained scenario depends on the ratio between the IT load and the cooling maximum sensible cooling and coils size, which in this case was 70 kW/45.9 kW = 1.52. The lower this number is, the lower the RTT variation is between the opened and contained scenarios during cooling failure.
A crucial reliability impact of coupling between the IT and the cooling unit in contained solutions that is yet to be addressed is the potential airflow mismatch. During a cooling failure scenario, the IT airflow deviates from its designed free delivery (FD), while the inlet (external) temperature remains within the recommended range. This has severe implications at the IT component level. To address some of these concerns, a new testing methodology of an IT air system was proposed in [13] . AFCs were obtained for different types of compute, storage, and network equipment. Then their air systems were ranked using the FD and critical pressure characteristics. It was observed that any IT equipment, especially in the containment, can experience three regions of airflow (i.e., aided, hindered, and reversed) depending on facility operation. CPU reliability was tested against the airflow regions and it was shown that the chance of component failure increased as the airflow moved into the second region (reduced airflow from IT FD). The AFCs were also found to be an essential boundary condition to realistically model facility operation for the containment with different IT configurations. This study will carry out a detailed experimental characterization of a DC facility from the chiller to the chip levels during airside (i.e., blower) cooling failure. The airflow and hot spot formation are reported during the failure-recovery scenarios. The effects of cooling set points on OPEX and uptime are discussed. Also, the variation between the external discrete measurements and the IT internal measurements are addressed during the failure both with and without aisle containment deployed. This study is novel for its representation of a real life DC aisle with a real IT load used. Given this, the interaction between the IT and the cooling system can be uniquely captured. Here the focus is on system integration to find out how the IT interacts with the cooling system, IT inlet measuring scheme, and containment during a cooling failure.
II. FACILITY DESCRIPTION
The DC layout is shown in Fig. 1 . The facility is 215 m 2 (2315 ft 2 ) with a 0.91-m (3-ft) plenum depth and a 5.18-m (17-ft) ceiling height [15] , [16] . In addition, there is a step (raised floor cutout) to the right-hand side (RHS) of the facility, making the plenum 0.305 m (1 ft) shallower in that vicinity. A total of 46 perforated tiles are distributed throughout the facility with a perforation ratio of 22%. Fifty racks are placed in the white space forming four cold aisles A-D and an RDHX configuration rack. The CAC can be mounted on or off aisle C. 6 .32 ft × 10.16 ft × 2.92 ft) chilled water-based unit serves the white space and is rated at ∼114 kW (∼32 tons) of cooling capacity. Three blowers, CRAH with a variable frequency drive (VFD), provide a modulating airflow supply based on the IT needs. The unit is equipped with a turning vane on the supply side to direct cold air to the cold aisle [15] . This perimeter cooling unit is the primary source of cooling for the white space with two local exceptions: 1) the RDHX unit and 2) a local warm water loop to cool processors for most of the IT components in rack C2-5 working jointly with the servers fans. During this experiment, the RDHX units (heat exchanger and IT) are offline. The local water loop in C2-5 is running with minimized circulation in order to concentrate the load on the CRAH unit. The power distribution in the facility is ac. In summary, the experimental procedure discussed in this paper takes place mainly in aisle C and aisle A.
III. INSTRUMENTATION
Several tools are used to measure different aspects of the transport field in this experiment, as shown in Fig. 2 . Some of these tools are automated while others are inherently manual. The flow hood (ADM-850L) is used to measure tile delivery with a measured uncertainty of ±5%-10% depending on the tile location. A vane anemometer is used to check the accuracy of the flow hood compensation for back pressure [16] . To measure pressure differentials, an airdata multimeter (ADM-860C) is used with a given accuracy of ±0.2 Pa (0.0008 in H 2 O). For capturing the rack inlet temperature and velocity fields, the MTVM is used [17] , [18] . We have designed this device to collect data per IT in the rack with a minimum airflow disruption, which is done by mounting a hexagonal mesh to a cuboid frame with wheels. The MTVM measures temperatures and velocities using a UAS1000 plastic cap head combined thermistors and hot wires at 36 measuring points with ±0.4°C (±0.7°F) and ±5% accuracy for temperature and velocity, respectively. After specifying the time stamp conditions, the MTVM is positioned at locations of interest and the data are collected and delivered through the local network to generate live temperature and velocity contours. To capture the hot spot formation/dissipation at IT inlets in opened versus contained aisles during the failure, the MTVM is placed at the inlet of the middle rack C1-4 during failure recovery scenarios. The sample rate is set to 5 s. To capture the air inlet temperatures of the rest of the IT devices in aisles A and C, iButton temperature sensors are used.
iButtons are lithium-cell-shaped devices that contain a digital thermometer with a resolution of ±0.5°C (±0.9°F).
Each iButton is set to start data acquisition at a prescribed time. After the experiment is completed, they are collected and their data are imported into a personal computer. iButtons are fixated at locations of interest using putty, making them adaptable to relocation at any position.
iButton sensors are used with a sampling rate of 1 min as follows (in most cases, instrumentation is based on the deployed IT device height not that of the rack). Each rack has two Server Technology PDUs in a master/slave arrangement. The rack power data are collected through the network. Data are also collected from servers using a Linux service [19] , which initiates during the startup of a server. The tool uses the Linux coretemp module to fetch per CPU temperature and also uses the OpenIPMI library to obtain sensor information, such as fan RPM, inlet temperature and power consumed. This service polls continuously to get all the aforementioned data, and once the data are available, they are recorded with timestamp information with secondsmicroseconds precision and are then written to a centralized application database using the TCP/IP protocol. The centralized application runs multiple threads that listen for incoming data from the Linux service that is running on the servers and polls data from PDUs and the CRAH unit. The PDU and CRAH units' data are fetched using an SNMP asynchronous request available in the Net-SNMP library. The centralized application continuously polls for the sensor data, and once the data are available, the sensor data along with the timestamp information are logged into a datasheet.
The aforementioned instrumentations are quantitative and facilitate the derivation of physical parameters with which to analyze the thermal response. However, to understand the overall qualitative behavior of the facility, other instruments are used as well, and are shown in Fig. 2 . An FLIR E4 infrared (IR) camera is used to capture hot spots and show variations before, during, and after failure/recovery. Note that the temperature readings that are reported here are surface temperatures and are a function of the surface emissivity and the predefined reference temperature. IR images are taken at an emissivity ∂ = 0.95 and a reference ambient temperature T r = 20°C (68°F). To understand the airflow pattern, a smoke (fog) trace method is used. A Mini Colt smoke generator is used to produce smoke traces and visualize the airflow pattern and recirculation paths. Propylene glycol (PN MS191) liquid is used as the source of smoke, and while it does not affect the IT or user, the smoke tests are run while the fire detection system is offline.
IV. FACILITY HEAT DISSIPATION
The heat dissipation of the facility is described as follows. 1) All the servers PXE/NFS boot from the network into a Debian Jessie environment running Linux 3.16.14.
We ran the Linux stress test with cores equal to the maximum available cores on the server to load the CPUs to 100% utilization. The initial total IT load is measured as 81 kW with ±1.5% variation. 2) UPS units vary between 4-6 kW depending on operation and battery charge status. 3) There are 24 LED F8B lighting fixtures, of which the heat dissipation can be approximated to be 3.5 kW [6] . 4) Thirty-seven operating PDUs (single-phase ac, 208-240 V and 24 A) have an approximated to 30 W each. The total heat dissipation is 1.1 kW. 5) Solar radiation load depends on the DC orientation, area, material emissivity, season, and time of day. However, the SHGC in the following is expected to be minimum since low-e glass is used and the solar load is neglected in this experiment [23] : SHGC = Solar heat gain through the window Solar radiation incident on the window .
(1)
V. DESCRIPTION OF FAILURE SCENARIOS
In this paper, cooling failure refers to the failure in the airside (i.e., blowers). Additional cases of water side and total failures will be discussed in a sequel study. After being in the first steady state (before failure), the CRAH blowers are failed and the temperatures are monitored until reaching a certain constraint, which in this case is ASHRAE A2 at the IT inlets. Then, the blowers are restored and recovery takes place until reaching the second steady state. There are two main variations in the exercised scenarios.
1) Changing Set Points of Cooling Operation: Here, the transient perturbation is run during the operation at a 15°C (59°F) SAT and 100% VFD blower speed. Then, as an energy efficiency practice, the SAT is increased to 20°C (68°F) and 90% VFD blower speed, and then the failure is run again. Note that in both cases, the CRAH IT airflow is higher than 1:1 (IT airflow was previously analyzed in [13] ). Based on (2) [20] , the calculated COP or COP R for the chiller refrigeration cycles and measured blower powers for the two set points are COP = 2 and P B = 13.78 hp (10.27 kW) and COP = 3.2 and P B = 9.11 hp (6.79 kW) for the first and second set points, respectively. Note that this variation will explain the tradeoff between an uptime loss and energy saving gain in the final sections when related to the PUE values. Herein, the COP and blower power values or the first set point and the second set point terminology will be used to refer to the two tested points of normal operation (before the failure)
2) Open Versus CAC in Aisle C: Another very common energy efficiency practice is the deployment of CAC. The failure/recovery perturbation is run in both cases of open aisle or CAC in the compute aisle C. The containment consists of two slap hinged doors, side panels, and a flexible roof, all of which are removed during the open aisle failure scenarios. It should be mentioned that the CAC is not fully sealed from leakage paths. For example, under rack leakage is maintained unsealed, as in Fig. 7(c) , for IT reliability purposes during failure. This will damp the generation of back pressure (i.e., external impedance) during cooling failure and control the reduction of IT FD [13] . This variation will facilitate an understanding of the effect containment has on the IT during cooling failure such as IT fan RPM and power consumption. For the first time in the literature, the interaction of containment with its surrounding aisles and ancillary equipment will be shown. Hereafter, open aisles refer to no CAC in aisle C and the CAC or contained refers to the CAC installed in aisle C. In conclusion, four cases of failure are run with two different set points (the first set point at lower SAT, lower COP and higher blower power consumption, and a second cooling set point at higher SAT, higher COP and lower blower power consumption) and with open/CAC configurations.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the DoE process utilized a previously validated CFD model of the facility [15] , [16] (see Supplementary Information for the facility model). The simulation is used to select the main variations to exercise in the experiment. This is an important step before implementing large-scale experiments. One of the main observations during the simulation is that during an airside failure with CAC deployed, the FD airflow is lost to all the IT components in the containment at the very instant of the cooling failure, even though the external IT inlet temperature takes much longer to exceed the ASHRAE limits [13] .
VI. COOLING SYSTEM RESPONSE
Cooling failure perturbation is introduced after 15±1.5 min of data collection for the open aisle system case and after 25 ± 1.5 min for the CAC case. The system takes a longer time to reach the second steady state after recovery is initiated for the CAC case. Note that the different components in the DC (CRAH, IT inlets, IPMIs, CPUs, cabinet frames) will reach the steady state again with different durations of time. This is a function of the location, stored thermal energy, and exposure to the cold air stream. Fig. 3(a) and (e) shows the pressure differential readings of the CRAH as a function of time for the open aisles and CAC scenarios at high blower operation, respectively. For both cases, the first steady-state pressure differentials across the filters, cooling coils, and blowers are 0.51, 1.13, and 2.16 in H 2 O (127, 281, and 538 Pa), respectively. The blowers are turned OFF after 15 and 25 min of data logging for the open and CAC cases, respectively. After the temperature constraint is reached at the IT inlets, the blowers are restarted and placed back online (recovery). The ramp up/down function of the blowers is controlled by the PI and is in the range of 10-20 s.
The local chilled water side of the CRAH consists of a pump (for which the water airflow is constant during the experiment) and a three-way valve to control mixing from the chiller input. The chiller unit is shared between the building and the DC and is subjected to variation in load from the building side. A water-side economizer mode initiates at ambient temperatures below 50°F (10°C). Note that the DC is located in Binghamton, NY, USA, and the experiment was carried out in December 2015. At that period, the temperatures varied higher and lower than the economizer constraint. These real-life factors have slight effects on the experiment since the three-way valve continuously modulates to yield the required SAT, while the chiller input might vary slightly. Fig. 3(b) -(d) shows the CRAH airside and water response during the open aisle system failure. At the first set point (COP = 2 and P B = 13.78 hp), the RAT starts at 78°F (25.5°C). Then as cooling failure takes place, the RAT reaches 89°F (31.6°C) within ∼21 min. As cooling recovery takes place, the RAT returns to 79°F (26.1°C) in ∼40 min. For the second set point (COP = 3.2 and P B = 9.11 hp), the first steady-state RAT is 83°F (28.3°C) and then reaches 89°F (31.6°C) within 14 min of failure. The system then recovers back to 86°F within 20 min. The SAT response for both set points is regulated by the PI controller to maintain the requested supply air set points. Note that there is a sudden short-term decline of the SAT when recovery is initiated. This occurs because the plug/residual of cold air surrounding the cooling coil is suddenly pushed out as the blowers recover.
The main observation at the water side is that the CHWST and the CHWRT coincide during failure since the heat load delivered by the airflow to the coils is close to none. The values of CHWRT go slightly below the CHWST for the second set point during failure, which is due to a reading error.
For the RRH, the initial steady-state values are 34% and 24.5% for both the first and second set points, respectively. Naturally, as the dry bulb temperature increases the maximum amount of moisture (m g ), the air can hold increases as well and since there is no humidification system, the current amount of moisture the air holds (m ν ) is constant. Thereby, based on (3), the relative humidity values decrease at elevated temperatures. The same argument applies to the SRH values, which read 58% and 38% for the first and second set points, respectively
There are two notes to be mindful of on the transient response of humidity. First, there is a surge in the SRH values when recovery is initiated, which is caused by the aforementioned short-term plug of cold air at the SAT side. Second, as failure begins and RAT increases, the RRH decreases until recovery takes place. Fig. 3(f) -(h) shows the CRAH airside and water response during the CAC system failure. At the first set point, the RAT starts at 77°F (25°C), and after then, as cooling failure takes place, the RAT reaches 95°F (35°C) within ∼35 min. As cooling recovery takes place, the RAT returns to at 79°F (26.1°C) in ∼86 min. For the second set point, the first steady-state RAT is 85°F (29.4°C) and then reaches 95°F (35°C) within 15 min of failure. The system then recovers back to 86°F (30°C) within 104 min. For both set point operations, the SAT actually decreases during failure since a lower amount of air is passively passing (drawn by IT fans/not pushed by CRAH blowers) through the cooling coils. At the water side, the CHWST and the CHWRT retain a small difference during failure, indicating that there is some passive airflow through the CRAH with some heat transported to the cooling coils. The SRH increases during failure since the SAT is lower, and conversely, the RRH values decrease as the RAT increases during failure.
VII. AIRFLOW AND PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL ANALYSIS
Tile airflow is measured for the four cases during the first steady state and during failure. This is performed for tiles C1-C18 in compute aisle C and A1-A3 in network aisle A. Fig. 4(a) shows the tile delivery data for the opened aisles. The general trend shows a uniform tile delivery due to the pressure values in the plenum. The average and total tile deliveries are 572, 12 023, and 517, 10 875 CFM (0.27, 5.67 and 0.24, 5.13 m 3 /s) for the high and low CRAH's blower power operations, respectively. During failure, the average and total tile deliveries are 21 and 382 and −36 and −109 CFM (0.01 and 0.15 and −0.17 and 0.051 m 3 /s) for aisles C and A, respectively. Fig. 4(b) shows the tile response after the CAC is added. The average and total tile deliveries are 573 and 12 031, and 526 and 11 065 CFM (0.27 and 5.68 and 0.25 and 5.22 m 3 /s) for the high and low blower power operations, respectively. Note that the values for the lower blower power in the CAC case are higher since the IT components are coupled to the CRAH, which makes the tile pressure difference less sensitive to the 10% reduction in the VFD speed. This coupling will also yield a different behavior during failure in the CAC.
It should be noted that during CAC failure, the IT have two fan speed (RPM) thresholds; a low to high speed transition takes place during the cooling failure. During failure and low IT RPM, the average and total tile deliveries are 196 and 3057 and −251 and −754 CFM (0.09 and 1.44 and −0.12 and −0.36 m 3 /s) for aisles C and A, respectively. During failure and high IT RPM, the average and total tile deliveries are 254 and 4571 and −286 and −858 CFM (0.12 and 4571 and −0.13 and −0.41 m 3 /s) for aisles C and A, respectively. These results show that the suction created by the IT in the containment is enough to draw air from the tiles of neighboring aisle A.
Since the CRAH blowers are off, the IT in CAC aisle C passively draw air stored in the plenum through the CRAH, floor leakages, and tiles in network aisle A. This interaction between the CAC compute aisle and the open network aisle shows that the MS in aisle A is actually under a greater risk of overheating. It will be shown in later sections that the negative tile delivery in aisle A pulls hot spots closer to the upper MS. Another observation is that the IT experiences a subtle variation in RPM in open aisle failure, whereas in the CAC failure, about 50% of the IT ends up running at the maximum RPM. The pressure differential data explains the tile delivery. The locations of the pressure measurements are shown in Fig. 1 . The three green dashed circles denote the locations of the plenum/room pressure differential measurements. The blue dashed circles refer to the locations of plenum/cold aisle pressure measurement locations, and the red dashed rectangle shows the location where the room hot aisle/cold aisle (HA/CA) pressure differential is measured. Locations are chosen based on careful facility inspection to report the most representative values. For instance, the props are located away from the IT outlet airflow vents so that the static pressure reading is unaffected when measuring the HA/CA pressure differential. Also, the locations selected for the plenum/room pressure differential measurements were chosen to include the lowest and highest values throughout the facility. Table I shows that before failure, the plenum/room pressure readings are very similar for the cases of open and CAC. The RHS of the facility reads the highest pressure value ∼30 Pa (0.12 in H 2 O) since it is measured near the wall where the main jet airflow supply stream from the CRAH collides with the wall causing stagnation. However, when failure takes place, the open aisles' environment barely generates any pressure differential since the IT is allowed to recirculate air from the room (hot aisle). In the CAC case, the IT components are partially restricted to drawing air from the tiles and plenum due to the presence of leakage [21] . This generates a negative pressure differential between the room and plenum, indicating that the IT draws air from all possible paths in the room (downward). The negative pressure differential increases as the IT fans modulate from a low to high RPM.
Similarly, Table I shows that before failure, the plenum/cold aisle C pressure readings are very similar for the cases of open and CAC. The pattern shows that the values of pressure increase as the distance from the CRAH is increased. This is again due to jet stagnation at the wall away from the CRAH. During failure, the open aisle case fails to show any significant pressure differentials, which explains the very low tile airflow readings discussed earlier. However, those values are much higher in the case of the CAC since higher pressure differentials are formed across the tiles, thus forcing more airflow through (upward).
Finally, the HA/CA pressure differentials for both open and CAC cases are also shown in Table I . During normal operation (initial steady state or before failure), both systems yield a marginal differential pressure values, indicating that the IT airflow provisioning is within the 1:1 range. As the failure takes place, the pressure differentials remain marginal in the case of the open aisle, since IT airflow recirculation is allowed. This is not the case for the CAC scenario, where external impedance starts to form since the CRAH blowers are off, making the tile the primary/only allowed source of airflow. This induces a pressure differential of 6 Pa (0.02 in H 2 O) and 13 Pa (0.05 in H 2 O) at low and high RPMs, respectively. Note that based on the sensitivity of the air system of each IT, the (FD) reduction is dictated. This moves the operation of the AFC of the IT into the second region (hindered airflow), in which component overheating is possible since the IT airflow intake is reduced from the FD.
VIII. FACILITY VISUALIZATION OF THE AIRFLOW PATTERNS AND THERMAL FIELDS DURING FAILURE/RECOVERY
A. Failure-Recovery Experimental Temperature Contours
Prior to looking at the quantitative data of the IT inlet temperature curves, the formations of hot spots are investigated. During the failure-recovery transient variation, as shown in Fig. 1 , the MTVM is placed in front of rack C1-4 to capture the variations in the temperature field at the rack/IT inlets. Fig. 5(a) shows the rack inlet temperature field during failure in open aisle C. Note that the legend bounds are chosen to give a higher visibility to hot spot formations and dissipations. Initially, the inlet temperature field is uniform at the CRAH SAT set point. As cooling failure is induced, the tile airflow delivery is minimized. IT inlets start drawing (recirculating) hot air through the top of the cold aisle, thereby hot spots are formed from top to bottom and the upper IT overheats first. When the cooling system recovers, the blowers ramp up to their original airflow. The cold airflow through the tiles pushes the hot spots out of the cold aisle. With time, the temperature field is restored to the original steady state. Fig. 5(b) shows the failure-recovery behavior at rack C1-4 inlet while CAC is deployed in aisle C. It is clear that these hot spot formations are drastically different from those in the previous case. During failure, hot air starts recirculating through all possible containment leakages. The leakage locations are not only mainly under the rack but also between the rack frames, as seen in Figs. 6(b) and (c) and 7(c). This explains the hot spots forming at the bottom and sides of the rack. The maximum temperature is first reached at the bottom, indicating that the bottom IT overheats first. As cooling recovery starts, cold air through the tiles replaces hot air in the cold aisle and the HA/CA pressure differential diminishes. Note that there are residuals of the bottom hot spot at the far right contour. This is mainly because the surface temperature of the rack's lower frames has increased significantly during failure. 
B. Thermal Imaging
Applying thermal imaging can provide a practical and quick qualitative understanding of hot spot formation. It is also found to uphold the previous discussion of the air and metal surface temperatures. For the CAC case, Fig. 6 shows the surface's thermal signature in the cold aisle between rack frames and at under rack leakage locations. The temperature reading on the upper left corner shows the surface temperature where the indicator is pointing. Note that there is some variation in the temperature legend due to instrument limitations. The CAC initially shows a uniform temperature field, but after failure takes place, hot spots start forming inside the CAC, which are derived by leakage locations. The overheating of the side rack frames is obvious due to the leakage path. It can be seen that the metal surface temperature increases from 21°C to 41°C (69.8°F-105.8°F). Similarly, the lower rack frame near the under rack leakage path is initially at 20.2°C (68.36°F) and reaches 37.3°C (99.14°F) during failure. This is an important example that shows that the cabinet frames have a significant contribution to the duration of uptime during failure as well as to the recovery time during restoration since they behave as heat reservoirs with significant thermal inertia (also called thermal capacitance or thermal mass). 
C. Airflow Smoke Trace
In this section, the airflow patterns are examined and explained. This will consolidate the previous comments that are made in Sections VIII-A and VIII-B. Fig. 7(a) shows the recirculation path during the cooling failure of open aisle C. As reflected in the image, the hot air steam moves from the IT outlets through the top of the aisle and back to the IT intakes. Fig. 7 
IX. EXTERNAL IT INLET TEMPERATURE RESPONSE
Today's DC monitoring tools or DCIM systems rely on the air inlet temperature at selected locations based on best practices. The locations of the discrete sensors (iButtons) are discussed in the instrumentation section. In aisle C, sensors are placed at the bottom, middle, and top servers. A comparison will be made between the air inlet temperature discussed here and the IPMI data from the servers in the next section. Hence, it is important to explain the servers naming scheme. The iButtons are located, as seen in Figs. 1(b) and 2(c) , at the inlets of the bottom, middle, and upper servers of racks C1-1, C1-4, and C1-8, which have identical IT deployment. The servers are located at 5, 32, and 56 in (12.7, 81.3, and 139.7 cm) from the raised floor, respectively. They also correspond to 1 RU (∼1.75 in), 17 RUs, and 31 RUs on the rack mounting rails, and the racks are 45 RUs. Essentially, the racks' heights from the raised floor are 83 in, including a 2-in under-rack gap, as shown in Fig. 7(c) . The server names for each rack are as follows.
1) Rack C1-1: Bottom, middle, and top servers' names are d2950-001, d2950-009, and d2950-016, respectively. 2) Rack C1-4: Bottom, middle, and top servers' names are d2950-049, d2950-057, and d2950-064, respectively. 3) Rack C1-8: Bottom, middle, and top servers' names are d2950-113, d2950-121, and d2950-128, respectively. IT overheating inherently takes place in the vicinity of high load density. Hence, it will be seen that, for the most part, IT in aisles C will dictate the uptime or RTT. The manufacturer has specified the maximum operating limit of the IT to be at a 35°C (95°F) inlet temperature (ASHRAE air class 2 envelope). This will be used as our constraint condition for stop failure and start recovery. For brevity, results are shown only for the rack/IT that first reach or exceed the ASHRAE A2 allowable limit.
It is also important to understand the thermal profile of the environment around the main compute aisle (opened or contained). For instance, aisle A has the MS units for which operation is critical to the whole facility. Similarly, maintaining the environmental inlet conditions for the UPS is important during power outages. Fig. 8(a) shows the temperature response curve for servers in rack C1-4 for an open aisle configuration. For both cooling set points, it can be seen that the highest temperatures reach the inlet of the upper server d2950-64. For the first set point, the inlet temperature of the upper server is 18°C (64°F). The RTT is measured to be 20 min for the first server in aisle C (in this case it was in rack C1-4) to reach the A2 limit. For the second set point, the steady-state temperature before failure is 22.5°C (72.5°F). The RTT is minimized by 50% to 10 min. As shown in Fig. 8(b) and (c), the IT in aisle A did not reach the temperature constraint.
A. Open Aisles
B. CAC
In contrast to the open aisle case, the highest inlet temperatures are reached by the bottom servers first due to their proximity to the leakage path in aisle C. In this case, it is found that the bottom server in rack C1-8 actually reaches the temperature threshold. Thereby, server d2950-113 will be used as the RTT criteria (first server to hit the temperature limit), which is shown in Fig. 9(a) . At the first cooling set point, the steady-state temperature before failure varies between 16°C and 17°C (60.8°F and 62.6°F) since the local water loop is adjusting to chiller supply variation. This has a negligible effect on the reported uptime metrics. The RTT measures 35 min before hitting the A2 limit. For the second cooling set point, the RTT is reduced by more than 50% to ∼14 min. Based on the external IT inlet temperatures in aisle C, the CAC system indicates a longer RTT and higher reliability during failure. However, contrasting results will be seen when inspecting the IT internal data. Fig. 9(b) shows that the temperature of the network aisle when CAC is deployed in aisle C. Aisle A data show that the MS actually reaches the A2 limit. However, telecom (telecommunication) equipment has a higher inlet temperature tolerance (usually 40°C/104°F) and therefore is not used as a termination factor to start recovery. Yet, it can be safely said that the common practice of containing one of the aisles in the DC with others opened can have a negative impact on the IT in open aisles especially during cooling failures. Note that the negative tile airflow in aisle A pulls the upper hot air down, as shown in Fig. 4(b) , thus increasing IT reliability concerns.
X. INTERNAL IT INLET TEMPERATURE RESPONSE (IPMI-BASED)
For brevity and consistency of method, we will report IPMI data for servers/racks upon which uptimes are defined.
Then the rack PDU data for other racks will be shown to support the conclusions.
The IPMI data will be compared to the external air inlet data at critical IT, upper server d2950-064, and in rack C1-4 for the open aisle case. Similarly, the IPMI data will be compared to the external air inlet data in the critical IT, lower server d2950-113, and rack C1-8 for the CAC case. The fan RPM, CPU temperature, and server's active power consumption is also discussed.
A. Open Aisles
The inlet temperature IPMI data for the IT in rack C1-4 are shown in Fig. 10(a) . It is clear that the temperatures during the steady state before failure are higher compared to the iButton, the external air inlet temperature sensors. This is attributed to the close proximity of the IPMI sensors to the hardware. The upper server d2950-064 measures an RTT of 17 min during the first set point failure. For the second set point of cooling operation, the RTT is measured as 9 min. The rest of the IPMI data are shown in Fig. 11(b)-(d) .
The maximum CPU temperature is below 80°C during failure for the first set point. The fan speed of the upper server increases from 6875 to 13 125 r/min during failure at the first set point. At the second set point failure, the fans originally start at a 7500 r/min since the SAT is elevated. This shows that while applying energy efficiency practices, increasing the set point might also increase the IT power consumption. During failure, the fans also reach 13 125 r/min. The active power curves show that for the first set point operation, the power of the upper server increases from 380 to 450 W during failure. This is attributed to the increase in fan speed and increase in processor current leakage. To reiterate, this illustrates that while applying energy efficiency practices, increasing the set point can increase the IT power consumption. Therefore, further optimization is required. Fig. 11(a) shows the IPMI inlet data for the IT in rack C1-8. For the first set point, the temperatures are colder than the open system case since mixing is minimized. As cooling failure takes place, all the servers show a very similar response regardless of location (proximity to the source of recirculation during failure, in this case under rack leakage). This is mainly because of the back pressure induced in the CAC during failure [6 Pa (0.02 in H 2 O) at low RPM and 13 Pa (0.05 in H 2 O) at high RPM], as shown in Table I . This back pressure (external impedance) will move the operating point of the servers' airflow system from FD to the second region of air flow (reduced airflow from the IT required FD airflow), as shown in Fig. 12 . The AFCs shown are zoomed in to show airflow variation. Note that as the server ramps up from low to high RPM, the airflow reduction percentage decreases. This phenomenon is discussed in detail in [13] . During failure, external impedance forms instantaneously in the contained aisle, thereby shifting the IT operation from FD to hindered airflow. This causes the IPMI inlet and CPU temperature sensors to increase rapidly. To try and mediate the increase in temperature, the IT RPM increases, thus reaching the maximum RPM and causing spikes in power consumption. This clearly has significant ramifications for the IT power consumption as well as the facility airflow capacity, especially given that the IT airflow demand has more than doubled.
B. CAC in Aisle C
The measured RTT in this case is only 9 min, which is 74% less than the uptime estimated based on the external inlet temperature sensors (best practices based). Note that the external inlet temperature sensors are actually reading cold temperatures at the inlets and are giving a false indication of IT safety since they cannot measure the effect of airflow reduction through the IT. This reduction of airflow will result in a higher CPU temperature and higher IT fan speed, as shown in Fig. 11(b)-(d) . Note that processors are able to self-protect from overheating by throttling the computational effort and reducing frequency/voltage. However, even with their throttling component, failure might still take place based on the amount of airflow that is restricted [13] .
The containment (CAC in this case) has the advantage of creating a more uniform field of temperature and pressure at the IT inlets. However, during failure, the containment induces an airflow reduction due to the external impedance to all the IT components in the contained space. Each piece of the IT is affected differently based on the relative strength of its air system characterized by the critical pressure P C and FD F D unique characteristics [13] . Fig. 13 shows the PDU response of racks C1-1, C1-4, and C1-8 during failure/recovery for opened and contained cases. The higher power indicates that all IT components have ramped up their fan speed to the maximum during the containment failure. This can be attributed to internal overheating that is not captured by the external temperature monitoring tools. This is also experienced by the very high fan decibel level inside the CAC while conducting some measurements during the failure experiment.
An overall comparison of the RTT and the external and IPMI responses is summarized in Table II for five times longer for the CAC compared to the open case. This again indicates that higher internal overheating that takes place inside the server during CAC cooling failure, since the airflow FD is reduced. Since the IPMI sensors tend to be 4°C-5°C (7.2°F-9°F) higher than the outside sensors, the ROH metric is introduced to normalize the findings of the internal and external heating rates, as shown in (9) Rate of Heating
where T A 2 and T bf make up the ASHRAE A2 constraint (35°C, 95°F) and determine the temperature exactly before failure. Generally speaking, the IPMI inlet sensors are expected to have slightly slower rates of variation compared to the external air sensors, given that they are attached to PCBs. For open aisles, the ROH of the IPMI inlet temperature is shown to be slightly slower since it has a delay from its proximity to the thermal mass of the server. The ROH increases by 47% and 40% when the failure takes place at the higher set point for the air inlet (discrete external sensors) and IPMI inlet, respectively. In the case of CAC, the ROH for IPMI inlet temperature was actually two to three times faster than the external air inlet sensor since the internal sensor is more sensitive to hardware overheating. Finally, it is a common trend to better seal containment solutions (CAC, HAC, chimney, and RDHX) for many of the aforementioned reasons. However, when facing failure, better sealing can cause a higher external impedance to form at any conditions of airflow imbalance. Hence, the IT will overheat faster (higher ROH) based on its mix of air systems.
Based on these results, it can be said that deploying containment can actually reduce the AU in the event of a cooling failure. Furthermore, using external temperature measurements alone to draw conclusions about the IT resiliency during a failure event in containment can be misleading. Finally, higher power consumption is reported during cooling failure in the CAC due to the increased fans RPM. Air containment (CAC or HAC) creates a new relationship between the IT air systems and the airflow supply source. In the open aisle DC, each IT component is able to get its necessary airflow (i.e., FD airflow), independent of airflow through the other neighboring IT components and also independent of airflow through the perforated tiles even during a cooling failure. However, the CAC solution is constructed such that the cold aisle is boxed to isolate itself from the rest of the DC. This causes a new airflow relationship between all the IT components enclosed by the CAC. There is no longer an unlimited supply of low-impedance airflow from the open air room for all the IT components within the CAC. Instead, there is effectively a single source of constrained airflow either through the perforated tiles or through the CAC leakage.
XI. IMPACT OF COOLING SET POINTS ON DATA CENTER OPEX AND RESILIENCE
In this section, the impact of operating the DC at higher energy efficiency cooling set points is discussed. Equations (5)-(9) can be used to inspect the energy savings attributed to changing the SAT and P B . The PUE of the DC for operating at the first and second set points is calculated to be 1.55 and 1.30, respectively. The data are shown in Table III . The W net of the chiller is evaluated from (5), and the economizer usage percentage is subtracted from the chiller work. The W net of the blowers is measured, and then all calculations are annualized for 8640 h/year
Annual Energy Saving 
The procedure and assumptions for the calculations are as follows.
1) The annual chiller and blower loads are calculated based on measurements and formulations.
2) The values are normalized for a facility with 20 times the cooling units and IT load.
3) The electricity cost is at $0.1/kWh. 4) 30% annual economization for the first set point, which then increases to 50% in the second set point. The PUE (1/DCiE) along with the energy and OPEX savings data are shown in Table III . Energy savings are shown to be primarily due to chiller run time savings and water side economizer hours. The blower-to-chiller savings are about one sixth in this case. Nearly $350K of the total savings is realized when the SAT is increased and P B is decreased. However, this comes at the expense of reducing the uptime by more than 50% in the event of a cooling failure, as shown in Table II . The tradeoff between IT resilience during failure and efficiency is considered based on DC operation and service.
XII. CONCLUSION
This paper reports experimental data on the transient performance of DCs during cooling failures. The analysis is made for different set points of cooling and for open and contained environments. The internal server temperature sensors and IPMI data, fan RPM, and CPU temperature all had very different responses during the CAC failure compared to the case of an open aisle. The external inlet air temperature overestimates the RTT by ∼70%. The study also showed that the external temperature fields do not necessarily reflect the thermal performance of the IT, particularly when there are airflow imbalances in containment. The elevation of SAT and reduction of P B increases the energy efficiency operation and decreases the PUE (1.55-1.3) . However, the consequence is more than a 50% reduction in the uptime during failure. This paper addresses many of the interactions between the DC and the IT during a cooling failure, specifically the following.
1) The implication of energy saving practices on IT reliability and uptime during failure. It was shown that an increase in SAT by 5°C (9°F) with a 10% decrease in blower speed led to nearly 48% energy savings (depending on economizer hours). The down side was that the uptime during cooling failure was reduced by more than 50%.
2) The different schemes of formation and dissipation of hot spots in various open and contained aisles.
3) The airflow patterns and recirculation paths that cause hot spots in open and CAC aisles. 4) The thermal and aerodynamic interaction between multiple cold aisles serving different purposes in the facility. It was observed that open aisle A suffered from negative tile airflow when aisle C was contained during a cooling failure. 5) The reliability challenges (airflow reduction) that come with deploying containment during failure. 6) The difference between characterizing the DC performance metrics based on discrete sensors versus based on IT device onboard analytics, especially during CAC failure. Based on the experimental observations of the DC performance during normal operations and failures, the following recommendations can be made to enhance IT resilience when containment is deployed.
1) Possible airflow mismatches in the containment (due to failures, virtualization, and varying loads) require further availability and reliability guidelines to be incorporated with the current ASHRAE best practices since external inlet temperatures may not reflect the IT thermal performance during airflow imbalances. For the IT to be classified as ASHRAE A1, A2…products, the FD must be guaranteed or an allowable external impedance (back pressure) should be specified (e.g., a server is specified for A2 within x-range of back pressure/external impedance). 2) Containment solutions are rapidly expanding (regulated as building standard in some states) due to their energy efficiency benefits. Using sensors that are closer to the hardware becomes vital since the external sensors commonly used are blind to internal hardware overheating. Using both external and internal measurements can yield in optimum DC performance. It is also worth considering the use of pressure relief valves as a standard implementation in any containment solution. These mechanisms can mediate airflow imbalances during failures. However, this point will be addressed in future investigations since clearly it will also allow for hot air to recirculate and will have to be considered based on the cooling operation and IT temperature increase.
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